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CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS
AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
COMPLICATING THE COMPARATIVE TAXONOMY
Ronald J. Gilson*
Corporate governance scholarship has shifted focus in recent years from hostile
takeovers, which occur primarily in the widely held shareholder systems of the United
States and the United Kingdom, to the comparative merits of the "controlling
shareholder" systems that are the norm most everywhere else in the world. In this
emerging debate, the simple dichotomy between controlling shareholder systems and
widely held shareholder systems that has largely dominated the discourse is too coarse
to allow a deeper understanding of the diversity of ownership structures in different
national capital markets and their policy implications. In this Article, Professor Ronald
Gilson seeks to complicate the prevailing analysis of controlling shareholders and
corporate governance by developing a more nuanced taxonomy of controlling shareholder
structures and examining the implications of this view on our understanding of widely
held and controlling shareholder systems. Development of a new taxonomy begins with
recognition of the controlling shareholder tradeoff: focused monitoring in return for some
private benefits of control and at a cost in speed of adaptation. Building from this
tradeoff, this Article looks closely at two central features of a more complex taxonomy:
the concepts of controlling shareholders and of private benefits of control. In particular,
the framework highlights the value of distinguishing between efficient and inefficient
controlling shareholder systems, and between pecuniary and nonpecuniary private
benefits of control. Together, the two distinctions reframe the taxonomy of shareholder
distribution to distinguish between regimes that support companies with a diversity of
shareholder distributions and regimes that support only companies with a controlling
shareholder. This Article concludes by examining potential macroeconomic effects and
policy implications and calling for research under this new framework to further the
debate on controlling shareholder systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
T he big issue in corporate governance scholarship is changing.
Over the last fifteen years, the academic and policy debate has fo-
cused on hostile takeovers. The terms and tenor of the debate in the
* Stern Professor of Law and Business, Columbia Law School, Meyers Professor of Law and
Business, Stanford Law School, and fellow, European Corporate Governance Institute. An earlier
version of this paper was presented as a lecture on the occasion of the Swedish Corporate Gov-
ernance Forum's Ten Year Jubilee Seminar on the Future of Corporate Governance. I am grate-
ful to Jubilee seminar participants and to participants at workshops at the Fourth Asian Corpo-
rate Governance Conference, Bank of Italy, University of Cambridge School of Law, University of
Florence Faculty of Law, UniversitA Commerciale Luigi Bocconi (Milan), UniversitA di Cattolica
Faculty of Law (Milan), Institute for Law and Finance (Frankfurt), Stanford Law School, and the
Kirkland & Ellis Law and Economics Workshop for helpful comments. I also benefited from
comments by Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins, Victor Goldberg, Jeffrey Gordon, Jeremy Grant,
Curtis Milhaupt, Gunnar Nord, Robert Ohlsson, Katharina Pistor, Laura Ristori, Mark Roe,
Mathias Siems, Rolf Skog, Ok-Rial Song, Lorenzo Stanghellini, and Marco ventoruzzo.
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United States are by now numbingly familiar. The same pattern is
now observable in Europe, 1 where the tone of the debate, if not neces-
sarily its politics, seems to have moderated a great deal.'
As the issues surrounding hostile takeovers have clarified, attention
has begun to shift from debating a phenomenon - observed largely in
the United States and the United Kingdom, because only in those two
jurisdictions is control of most public companies in the public float -
to understanding the kind of control structure that dominates public
corporations everywhere other than the United States and the United
Kingdom. Put simply, public companies in the rest of the world typi-
cally have a single shareholder or group of shareholders with effective
voting control, often but not invariably without corresponding equity
holdings. Debate is now turning to the merits of these "controlling
shareholder" systems, both on their own terms and in comparison to
the "widely held shareholder" systems of the United States and the
United Kingdom.
In this Article, I venture some early thoughts concerning how this
inquiry might usefully be framed. The simple dichotomy between con-
trolling shareholder systems and widely held shareholder systems that
has largely dominated academic debate thus far seems to me much too
coarse to allow a deeper understanding of the diversity of ownership
structures in different national capital markets and of the policy impli-
cations of those structures. My goal here is to complicate the prevail-
ing analysis of controlling shareholders and corporate governance by
developing a more nuanced taxonomy of controlling shareholder struc-
tures, and then by examining the implications of this view on our un-
derstanding of widely held and controlling shareholder systems. Most
importantly, I will argue that this familiar dichotomy is simply so
coarse as to be wrong. I reach the conclusion, surprising in terms of
1 Fifteen years ago, European and American views differed quite dramatically. In the face of
the mainstreaming of hostile takeovers in the United States and United Kingdom, Continental
Europe had a radically different conception. Two quotations capture the tension of the period.
The Chairman of Deutsche Bank described hostile takeovers as one of the "blunders of American
capitalism." Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, On the Efficiency of the Market for Corporate Control,
43 KYKLOS 635, 635 (i99o). French President Francois Mitterrand characterized hostile take-
overs as "gangsterism and the law of the strongest." Id.
2 Marco Becht, an active participant in the European academic debate and a sophisticated
observer of the politics of European corporate governance, recently described the now civilized
role for hostile takeovers in Europe: "A European market for corporate control is seen as an inte-
gral part of a single capital market and a major driver of European competitiveness, innovation
and growth." Marco Becht, Reciprocity in Takeovers ii (European Corporate Governance Inst.,
Law Working Paper No. 14/2003, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=463003. To be sure,
the European Parliament finally approved the aptly numbered Thirteenth Directive only in a
substantially diluted form - the original European Commission proposal would have gone a
great deal further in establishing a European market for corporate control - but at least the de-
bate came to be framed in terms of subsidiarity and reciprocity rather than by epithets like
"gangsterism."
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the current debate but straightforward in light of a more complicated
taxonomy, that the appropriate distinction is between systems that
support a diversity of shareholder distributions and systems that essen-
tially support only controlling shareholder distributions. From this
perspective, the United States and Sweden, typically thought of as, re-
spectively, the quintessential widely held and controlling shareholder
systems, have much more in common with each other than Sweden
has with most other controlling shareholder systems.
Important early work on controlling shareholder regimes has taken
two general directions. The first, reflected in a series of articles by
Professors Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shlei-
fer, and Robert Vishny,3 linked the breadth of shareholder distribution
to the quality of a jurisdiction's law. In this account, controlling
shareholder regimes exist in jurisdictions whose legal systems do not
protect minority shareholders from dominant shareholders' diversion
of private benefits of control. As a result, a controlling shareholder
who takes a company public will not part with control; if she does,
someone else will purchase control in the market and exploit her. The
second direction finds the explanation for concentrated ownership pat-
terns in politics. In an important book, Professor Mark Roe identified
social democratic politics as the driving force toward ownership con-
centration. 4 Where labor, through politics, speaks with a unified voice,
capital must concentrate to respond effectively.
While they provide important insights, neither scholarly direction
sufficiently explains the patterns of shareholder distribution we ob-
serve. As Professor Roe notes, we observe controlling shareholder re-
gimes in jurisdictions with good law, so law cannot completely explain
the distribution.5 At the same time, we observe controlling share-
holder regimes in countries without serious social democratic move-
ments, so politics is likely not all of the answer either. Additionally,
because both approaches are essentially path dependency accounts -
the initial condition, whether quality of law or character of politics,
dictates the pattern of shareholder distribution - they lack an effi-
ciency account of the success of some controlling shareholder regimes.
As I have argued elsewhere, "the path dependent characteristics of a
given national governance system confront the disciplining effects of
the operative selection mechanisms. In the end, institutions are shaped
by a form of corporate governance plate tectonics, in which the de-
mands of current circumstances grind against the influence of initial
3 See sources cited infra note 20.
4 MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITI-
CAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT (2003).
5 Id. at 5.
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conditions."'6 Thus, a more complete explanation for the distribution
of shareholdings must incorporate politics, law, and efficiency, together
with the serendipity of each country's initial condition.
My effort to complicate the analysis of controlling shareholders and
corporate governance proceeds as follows. Part II sets out some neces-
sary background concerning both the phenomenon to be explained and
prior efforts at explanation. Part III provides a framework to struc-
ture the analysis: the controlling shareholder tradeoff. Part IV begins
to complicate the controlling shareholder taxonomy by defining good
law functionally rather than formally, and then distinguishing between
two very different kinds of controlling shareholders: efficient and inef-
ficient. The result is to replace the sharp dichotomy between control-
ling shareholder and widely held shareholder distributions with two
more textured categories: controlling shareholder regimes with func-
tionally bad law and regimes that have functionally good law and sup-
port a diversity of shareholder distributions. This second group in-
cludes both Sweden, which is characterized by companies with
controlling shareholders, and the United States, which is characterized
by companies with widely held shareholdings. Part V continues the
effort at complication by distinguishing between two different kinds of
private benefits of control: pecuniary and nonpecuniary. This distinc-
tion provides insights into the macroeconomic consequences of even
efficient controlling shareholder systems and into the dynamics that in-
fluence the systems' stability. Part VI concludes with a brief consid-
eration of some policy implications that arise from a more complicated
taxonomy of controlling shareholders.
II. BACKGROUND: FACTS AND GENERATIONS OF SCHOLARSHIP
At the risk of belaboring a familiar point, it is helpful to start by
recounting the actual ownership structure of publicly traded corpora-
tions. Over the last ten years, important empirical work has revealed
that, excluding the United States and the United Kingdom, the world-
wide corporate governance landscape has a monolithic feature: control
of publicly traded corporations is typically lodged in a single individ-
ual, family, or group.7 Professor Marco Becht, for example, reports
6 Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions
Matter?, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 327, 332 (1996).
7 See, e.g., Marco Becht & Colin Mayer, Introduction to THE CONTROL OF CORPORATE
EUROPE (Fabrizio Barca & Marco Becht eds., 2ooi); Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov & Larry
H.P Lang, The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations, 58 J. FIN.
ECON. 8I (2000); Mara Faccio & Larry H.P Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European
Corporations, 65 J. FIN. EcON. 365 (2002); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei
Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999); Jeremy Grant & Thomas
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that 82.5% of German listed companies, 65.8% of Italian listed com-
panies, and 64.2% of Swedish listed companies have a blocking share-
holder minority of at least 25%."
Moving the control level up to a majority lowers the percentage of
listed companies with a control block to 64.2% in Germany, 56.1% in
Italy, and 26.3% in Sweden, 9 but the importance of controlling share-
holders remains dramatic. In nine East Asian countries, Professors
Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, and Larry H.P. Lang found that a
single shareholder has control in more than two-thirds of listed firms.' 0
TABLE I. CONTROL BLOCKS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES"
Germany Italy Sweden East Asia
Block
Controlling 82.5% 65.8% 64.2% ---
>25%
Block
Controlling 64.2% 56.1% 26.3% 67.8%
_ 50% 
- ---------- A
It is also commonplace in Europe for control by a dominant share-
holder to result from structural devices that leverage voting rights
above the level of equity investment. For example, Table 2 shows that
66.i% of listed Swedish companies, 51.2% of listed Swiss companies,
41.4% of listed Italian companies, and 17.6% of listed German compa-
nies issue dual classes of common stock, with one class having dra-
matically higher voting rights.1 2 Control also frequently is enhanced
Kirchmaier, Who Governs? Corporate Ownership and Control Structures in Europe (June 7,
2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=55587 7 .8 Becht, supra note 2, at 19 fig.i (citing THE CONTROL OF CORPORATE EUROPE, supra
note 7).
9 Id. at ig fig.2 (citing THE CONTROL OF CORPORATE EUROPE, supra note 7).
1o Claessens, Djankov & Lang, supra note 7, at 92 tbl.3 , 93-94.
11 Id.; Becht, supra note 2, at 19 fig.2 (citing THE CONTROL OF CORPORATE EUROPE, su-
pra note 7). The data for the United States and the United Kingdom are dramatically different.
In the United Kingdom, only 15.9% of public companies have a 25% control block, and only 2.4%
have a 50% control block. In the United States, the comparable figures are 7.6% and 1.7% for
NYSE-listed companies, and 5.2% and 2.0% for NASDAQ-listed companies. Becht, supra note 2,
at 19 fig.2 (citing THE CONTROL OF CORPORATE EUROPE, supra note 7). Of S&P 5oo compa-
nies, 34% have some amount of founder family ownership, with the holdings averaging 18%.
Ronald C. Anderson, Sattar A. Mansi & David M. Reeb, Founding Family Ownership and the
Agency Cost of Debt, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 263, 269 (2003); see also Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung,
Family Control and the Rent-Seeking Society, 28 ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAC. 391,
392 tbl.i (2004) (reporting that four of the twenty largest publicly traded corporations in the
United States have families with share blocks of 20% or more).
12 Faccio & Lang, supra note 7, at 385-86. The general magnitudes are consistent across
sources. See, e.g., id.; Morten Bennedsen & Kasper Meisner Nielsen, The Impact of a Break-
1646 [Vol. i 19: 1641
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through the use of pyramids and multiple control chains.13 The pat-
tern is repeated in East Asia.
14
TABLE 2. USE OF DUAL CLASS STOCK To LEVERAGE
VOTING RIGHTS 5
Sweden Switzerland Italy [ Germany
Percentage
of Listed
Companies 66.1% 51.2% 41.4% 17.6%
with Dual
Class Stock
When faced with the empirical reality that systems in which con-
trol of most listed companies is in the public float are the exception
rather than the rule, scholars' and policymakers' initial reactions re-
flected a teleological view of the evolution of capital markets. They
saw a U.S./U.K.-style widely held distribution of stock ownership and
control as the end point of corporate governance development; pro-
gress consisted of accelerating what selection would make inevitable.
Although there were some early skeptics who argued for the continued
vitality of alternative systems - Professor Masahiko Aoki with respect
to "J-model" governance in Japan' 6 and Professors Julian Franks and
Colin Mayer with respect to "inside systems" in Europe 7 were among
the most tenacious - the belief that widely held shareholder systems
are superior seemed to influence global policy. A preference for dis-
persed shareholdings was plainly evident in the International Mone-
Through Rule on European Firms, 17 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 259, 263 tbl.i (2004). In Sweden, for
example, Professor Rolf Skog reports that controlling shareholders in companies with dual class
shares have 41% of the votes but only 25% of the equity. Rolf Skog, The European Union's Pro-
posed Takeover Directive, the "Breakthrough" Rule and the Swedish System of Dual Class Com-
mon Stock 12-13 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
13 See Faccio & Lang, supra note 7, at 390 tbl.8. For example, of the firms in Germany with a
family control block of 20%, 14.57% use a pyramid structure to leverage their equity. For Italy,
the figure is 20.34%. Id. See generally Grant & Kirchmaier, supra note 7, at 8, 14-15 (discussing
the use of a pyramid structure); Randall Morck, Daniel Wolfenzon & Bernard Yeung, Corporate
Governance, Economic Entrenchment and Growth 6-36 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Work-
ing Paper No. 10692, 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wio692 (same).
14 Stijn Claessens et al., Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large
Shareholdings, 57 J. FIN. 2741, 2742 (2002) ("East Asian firms also show a sharp divergence be-
tween cash-flow rights and control rights - that is, the largest shareholder is often able to control
a firm's operations with a relatively small direct stake in its cash-flow rights.").
15 Faccio & Lang, supra note 7, at 385-86.
16 See Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, 28 J. ECON. LITER-
ATURE i (iggo).
17 See Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, Capital Markets and Corporate Control: A Study of
France, Germany and the UK, 5 ECON. POLY 189 (199o).
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tary Fund's and the World Bank's responses to the 1997-1998 East
Asian financial crisis; the institutions conditioned financial assistance
not just on macroeconomic criteria, but also on corporate governance
reform.18 The same preference also seems to explain the centrality of
breakthrough rules in the debate over the European Commission's
2002 proposal for a Thirteenth Directive on takeovers.19
In turn, this critical view of controlling shareholder regimes re-
ceived academic support from a growing "law and finance" literature
that sought to reveal the empirical links between the quality of legal
regimes on the one hand, and the nature of national capital markets
and corporate governance systems on the other.20 For present pur-
poses, a particular claim is central to these accounts - that a control-
ling shareholder structure is associated with "bad law." In jurisdic-
tions in which minority shareholders are not protected from controlling
shareholders extracting large private benefits of control, the argument
runs, entrepreneurs will not part with control through public offerings
for fear of subsequent exploitation by an investor who could assemble
control through the market and extract private benefits, unchecked by
the legal system. Under this analysis, controlling shareholder systems
will be characterized by weak equity markets - too much liquidity
tied up in control blocks - and by large differences in the value of
controlling and minority blocks as a result of private benefit extraction
by the controlling shareholder.
This brings us to an emergent generation of scholarship that
stresses two themes. The first, largely positive, argues that the parsi-
18 See, e.g., John M. Broder, Asia Pacific Talks Vow Tough Action on Economic Crisis, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 26, 1997, at Ai; Timothy Lane et al., IMF-Supported Programs in Indonesia, Korea,
and Thailand: A Preliminary Assessment 72-73 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Occasional Paper No. 178,
1999), available at http://www.imforg/external/pubs/ft/op/opI78/OP,78.pdf. Ronald Dore cap-
tured something of the tone of this perspective in relation to Japan:
What ... all these slogans [concerning Japanese capital market reform] add up to is
a general belief that (i) the principles according to which the typical neoclassical eco-
nomics textbook says the economy ought to work are a priori correct principles, (2) those
principles are best exemplified in the American economy, (3) the rightness of those prin-
ciples is further confirmed by American success, and (4) Japan's present plight is not just
a cyclical phenomenon and a debt-deflation hangover from the bubble; it is the natural
and wholly just retribution visited on Japan for not following those principles.
Ronald Dore, Japan's Reform Debate: Patriotic Concern or Class Interest? Or Both?, 25 J. JAP-
ANESE STUD. 65, 66 (1999).
19 As sent to the European Parliament for approval in 2002, the proposed Thirteenth Directive
limited the operation of structural features like dual class common stock with different voting
rights when a bidder secured more than 75% of the target's equity. The result would have been
to move the European corporate governance environment in the direction of the U.S/U.K. pat-
tern. A more detailed discussion of the Thirteenth Directive appears infra pp. 1676-77.
20 See, e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, supra note 7; Rafael La Porta et al., Investor
Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2ooo); Rafael La Porta et al., Law and
Finance, io6 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (I998); Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External
Finance, 52 J. FIN. Ii3i (1997).
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mony of the law and finance taxonomy - which asks only whether a
national system is characterized by controlling shareholders - camou-
flages a much more complicated reality. In fact, countries with good
law and countries with bad law both may have controlling shareholder
systems.2 1 For example, both Mexico (with bad law) and Sweden
(with good law) have controlling shareholder systems. Moreover,
countries with controlling shareholder systems experience dramatically
different levels of private benefit extraction. 2 Mexican controlling
shareholders are said to expropriate more than a third of the value of
the company, while expropriation by their Swedish counterparts is lim-
ited to i % of company value.23
To complicate matters further, controlling shareholders come in dif-
ferent forms - for example, families as opposed to widely held corpo-
rations - and hold control through different devices. As we have
seen, some controlling shareholders' control is matched by their equity
investment, while others' control is leveraged through structural de-
vices like dual class stock and pyramids. Early empirical studies sug-
gest that, at least in some countries, the level of private benefit extrac-
tion differs among different types of controlling shareholders. Benefit
extraction is lower when the controlling shareholder's stock is widely
held than when it is family owned, and when the divergence between
control and equity is smaller.2 4
Recognizing the various types of controlling shareholders and their
potential for impacting minority shareholders differently gives rise to a
second, and as yet more tentative, theme in the new generation of con-
trolling shareholder scholarship: what, after all, is wrong with control-
ling shareholder systems? Here the concern is normative. If control-
ling shareholder regimes do not necessarily lead to the extraction of
large private benefits of control at the expense of minority sharehold-
ers, is there really a problem? In turn, this point reads back on the
21 See ROE, supra note 4. Professor Roe's emphasis on politics as a determinant of share-
holder distribution focuses on good law jurisdictions, but it is equally applicable to bad law juris-
dictions. The demand for law is, tautologically, politically driven. Thus, as we will see later,
there will be a political story in every jurisdiction. For example, political motivations are an im-
portant influence on business in countries without a social democratic tradition. See, e.g., Pra-
muan Bunkanwanicha & Yupana Wiwattanakantang, Tycoons Turned Leaders: Investigating the
Incentives for Holding Public Office (Oct. i, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.fma.org/Chicago/Papers/TycoonsTurnedLeadersMarch2oo5.pdf (concluding that Thai
companies whose executives become high political officials outperform similar companies).
22 See infra pp. 1654-55.
23 See Tatiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross-Country
Analysis, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 325, 334 tbl.3 (2003).
24 See Claessens, Djankov & Lang, supra note 7 (discussing divergence between ownership
and control in East Asia); Karl V. Lins, Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets,
38 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 159 (2003) (discussing the relationship between share-
holder control structure and corporate valuation in a variety of nations).
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law and finance lock-in theme. If private benefits of control are so low
that controlling shareholders need not fear subsequent dilutive private
benefit extraction if they part with control, why do we still observe a
pattern of concentrated shareholdings? This theme surfaced clearly in
Sweden's energetic defense of its dual class voting structure during the
European debate over the Thirteenth Directive. 25
So where does this recitation of familiar facts and emerging schol-
arly themes leave us? When the world seems more complicated than
what our theory can explain, we probably do not yet understand the
world. Put differently, perhaps the mistake is in thinking that the
critical factor in understanding corporate governance systems as dif-
ferent as those of Asia, Latin America, Europe, and Scandinavia is
their shared controlling shareholder systems broadly defined.2 6 And if
this is the mistake, then we need a richer taxonomy of controlling
shareholder systems than we are currently using. In this Article, I
propose a first step in responding to that deficiency by looking more
closely at two central features of a more complex taxonomy: the con-
cepts of controlling shareholders and of private benefits of control.
Both complications provide useful insights into the role of controlling
shareholders in corporate governance, and into the distribution of dif-
ferent shareholder systems across different countries.
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
The first step in complicating the taxonomy of controlling share-
holders is to understand what Professor Jeffrey Gordon and I have
called the controlling shareholder tradeoff.27  The role of controlling
shareholders lies at the intersection of two elements of the agency
problem that is at the core of public corporation governance. The first
element is the familiar agency problem that arises from the separation
of ownership and control. This problem is the target of governance
devices like hostile takeovers and independent directors that have been
the focus of so much attention over the last twenty years. While im-
portant techniques, these efforts to bridge the separation have signifi-
cant limitations. Getting the incentives right for independent directors
by, for example, paying them enough to secure their full attention may
25 See Skog, supra note 12.
26 Tolstoy's complication of the dichotomy between good and bad families captures the point
nicely: "Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way." LEO
TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 3 (Constance Garnett trans., Random House 1939) (1877). While
jurisdictions with widely distributed shareholder systems likely share a common set of character-
istics, the intuition is that controlling shareholder regimes differ in important ways among
themselves.
27 The following discussion draws on Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Con-
trolling Shareholders, i52 U. PA. L. REV 785 (2003).
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be inconsistent with their independence. Takeovers, in turn, are rather
blunt instruments: they are responsive to only some kinds of govern-
ance problems, 2 8 and the large premium necessary for success both
emphasizes their large transaction costs and makes them appropriate
only for very large problems.
From this perspective, a controlling shareholder may police the
management of public corporations better than the standard panoply
of market-oriented techniques employed when shareholdings are
widely held. This point motivates the efficiency defense of controlling
shareholder systems. Because she holds a large equity stake, a control-
ling shareholder is more likely to have the incentive either to monitor
managers effectively or to manage the company itself and, because of
proximity and lower information costs, may be able to catch problems
earlier. Rather than being the result of functionally bad law, a control-
ling shareholder system is in this view an alternative to the frictions
associated with ameliorating the separation of management and con-
trol that inevitably arises from widely held shareholdings.2 9
The second element of the public corporation agency problem is the
conflict between a controlling shareholder and noncontrolling share-
holders over the extraction of private benefits of control - benefits to
the controlling shareholder not provided to the minority shareholders
(and that drive the bad law/controlling shareholder regime nexus).
Thus, controlling shareholder monitoring as a means to ameliorate
managerial agency problems also comes with frictions. Conditional on
maintaining control, the less equity the controlling shareholder has, the
greater the incentive to extract private benefits; increased productivity
accrues to shareholders in proportion to their equity, while private
benefits of control are allocated based on governance power. In other
words, a controlling shareholder may increase productivity by effec-
tively managing the company or by effectively monitoring managers,
but also may take more than her share of the gain. 30 As we see in Part
28 For example, the hostile takeover may be an effective device for breaking up inefficient
conglomerates that require a purchaser to possess little internal information. In contrast, take-
overs may be less effective in fixing the problems of a single business requiring deep local knowl-
edge of the business that may not be available to an outside owner.
29 This view is consistent with empirical findings that firm value increases with the level of
inside ownership, at least over the lower ranges. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protec-
tion and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147 (2002); John J. McConnell & Henri Servaes, Addi-
tional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 595 (i99o); Randall
Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Management Ownership and Market Valuation, 20 J.
FIN. ECON. 293 (1988).
30 This view is consistent with empirical findings that firm value decreases with the difference
between equity ownership and voting control. See, e.g., Claessens, Djankov & Lang, supra note 7;
Lins, supra note 24; Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Incentives vs. Control: An Analy-
sis of U.S. Dual-Class Companies (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10240,
2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wq10240.
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IV, leveraged control may create an incentive to adopt strategies that
reduce productivity when private benefits of control are increased
sufficiently.
While these two elements appear distinct, there is a point of tan-
gency between them. Because controlling shareholders must bear the
direct costs of monitoring, liquidity, and nondiversification from hold-
ing a concentrated position, some private benefits of control likely are
necessary to induce a party to play that role. Thus, from the view-
point of public shareholders, the two elements of the corporate agency
problem present a tradeoff. Public shareholders will prefer a control-
ling shareholder as long as the benefits from the reduction in manage-
rial agency costs exceed the detriment of the controlling shareholder's
extraction of private benefits.
Framing the controlling shareholder structure as an alternative to
governance techniques such as independent directors and takeovers,
the attraction of which depends on a tradeoff between increased moni-
toring and increased private benefit extraction, provides a framework
to understand better the complexity of controlling shareholder systems
and the role of law. Different law may result in particu-
lar controlling shareholder systems having very different costs and
benefits.
IV. COMPLICATING THE CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER
TAXONOMY: DIFFERENT KINDS
OF CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS
The central implication of the controlling shareholder tradeoff
framework is that simply having a controlling shareholder governance
system is too general an observation to tell us very much. To be frank,
it is hardly a startling intuition that a taxonomy that divides the world
into two categories - the United States and the United Kingdom on
the one hand, and everyone else on the other - does not tell us very
much about the rest of the world. The payoff has to come from the
complications that follow.
A first cut at a more complicated taxonomy recognizes that a na-
tional pattern of concentrated control of publicly traded corporations
can be consistent with two very different equilibria. First, the owner-
ship pattern may reflect a structure of inefficient controlling share-
holders, in which bad law allows the cost of private benefit extraction
to exceed the benefits of more focused monitoring of management -
minority shareholders are net worse off from the controlling share-
holder's monitoring effort. Alternatively, the ownership pattern may
reflect a structure of efficient controlling shareholders, in which good
law helps the benefits of more focused monitoring exceed the costs of
private benefit extraction - minority shareholders are net better off
from the controlling shareholder's monitoring effort. From this per-
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spective, an inefficient controlling shareholder regime is a drag on the
financial system, while an efficient controlling shareholder regime can
be a preferred alternative to market-based monitoring.
This first step toward a more complex typology proves to have a
good deal of explanatory value. Without the ambition of being ex-
haustive, I survey the implications that follow from distinguishing be-
tween inefficient and efficient controlling shareholder systems in the
remainder of this Part.
A. Inefficient and Efficient Controlling Shareholder Systems
and the Quality of Law
First, a more complex taxonomy provides a context for understand-
ing the more nuanced empirical studies of controlling shareholder sys-
tems and, in particular, how different legal and quasi-legal institutions
support varying ownership patterns. For purposes of this inquiry, I
have in mind a legal realist's concept of law that is broader than typi-
cally reflected in the law and finance literature. Good law limits pri-
vate benefits of control to amounts that are smaller than the increased
productivity from more focused monitoring. To accomplish this out-
come, good law must specify substantive standards, require sufficient
disclosure that those with the power to enforce the standards know of
violations, and provide an effective enforcement process.3 1
Such a regime can be accomplished through detailed legislation, as
with European laws governing corporate groups, 32 or by judicially de-
veloped principles of fiduciary duty, as in the United States.33 In turn,
standard setting can be accomplished by formal legal rules or, as is
particularly important in the United Kingdom, through private regula-
tory organizations. Further, interactions with other social institutions
can influence the effectiveness of legal rules. For example, social
norms and the effectiveness of enforcement facilitate the specification
of substantive standards. (The operation of one's conscience has par-
ticularly low transaction costs.)3 4 Similarly, an energetic and uncen-
31 See Bernard Black, The Core Institutions that Support Strong Security Markets, 55 Bus. L.
1565, 1586-92 (2ooo).
32 See, e.g., GROUPS OF COMPANIES IN THE EEC (Eddy Wymeersch ed., 1993).
33 Vice Chancellor Strine's review of the behavior of Lord Black, the controlling shareholder of
Hollinger, Inc., is a good example of judicial standard-setting. See Hollinger Int'l, Inc. v. Black,
844 A.2d 1022 (Del. Ch. 2004).
34 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Do Norms Matter? A Cross-Country Examination, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 2151 (2oo). Economists have examined this intuition empirically by studying the impact of
differences between countries' dominant religions - presumably a powerful source of norms -
on economic growth. See Rafael La Porta et al., Trust in Large Organizations, 87 AM. ECON.
REV. 333, 336-37 (1997).
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sored press is complementary to the formal disclosure process.35  Al-
though it is relatively easy to describe the requirements of good law in
this broader functional sense, it is much more difficult to capture em-
pirically except through simple backward induction3 6 - countries
with low private benefits of control must have functionally good law.3
7
Now recall that the initial claim made in the law and finance litera-
ture is that controlling shareholder systems are associated with func-
tionally bad law: entrepreneurs retain control to protect themselves
against private benefit extraction by someone who might subsequently
assemble control if the existing controller gave it up. Having retained
control, the entrepreneur then exploits it by extracting private benefits
of control. This framework has clear empirical implications. In ineffi-
cient controlling shareholder systems, (i) the value of controlling
shares should be dramatically greater than minority shares; and (2) the
extent of private benefits will decrease with the amount of the control-
ling shareholders' equity holdings and increase with the difference be-
tween percentage of control and percentage of equity. In contrast, effi-
cient controlling shareholder systems will be characterized by
functionally good law: that is, law and related social institutions that
effectively limit private benefit extraction to an amount sufficient to
compensate a controlling shareholder for the costs of focused monitor-
ing, but less than the benefit all shareholders receive from such moni-
toring. Thus, in efficient controlling shareholder systems (3) the value
of controlling shares will exceed that of minority shares by a much
smaller amount than in inefficient controlling shareholder systems.
The new generation of scholarship supports all three implications
of the controlling shareholder tradeoff framework. The level of pri-
vate benefit extraction should be reflected in the difference in value
between controlling and minority shares; only the value of controlling
shares includes the net present value of expected private benefits of
control. As shown in Table 3 below, the level of private benefit extrac-
tion is large in functionally bad law regimes whether measured by the
35 See Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An International Com-
parison, 59 J. FIN. 537, 577, 582, 586 (2004).
36 For example, Professors Alexander Dyck and Luigi Zingales argue that a strong press is an
alternative to good law; it may fill gaps in the formal disclosure regime and, by publicizing norm-
violating conduct, fill gaps in the formal enforcement regime through public shaming. See id.
Here I note simply that the public press is itself much more effective when there is an effective
legal disclosure regime. Thus, one may reason backwards from the presence of an effective press
to the existence of an effective disclosure regime.
37 While the discussion in the text defines good law and bad law by reference to protection of
minority shareholders from a controlling shareholder, one can also identify bad law for widely
held shareholder systems. For example, takeover law that allows target directors to resist a take-
over is bad law for widely held companies and irrelevant for controlling shareholder companies
except to the extent that it reduces the value of widely held companies relative to companies with
a controlling shareholder.
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difference between the market price of high-voting and low-voting
shares,38 or by the size of the premium paid for a controlling block of
shares.39 Measured by market price differential, control represents
approximately 36% of firm value in Mexico, 29% in Italy, and only i%
in Sweden. 40  Measured by the size of block premium to the value of
firm equity, control represents 34% of firm value in Mexico, 37% in It-
aly, and 7% in Sweden. 4 1 Mexico and Italy are typically characterized
as bad law states and Sweden as a good law state. The studies pre-
senting each measurement method conclude that differences in the
quality of law account for a large portion of the difference between
countries. 42
TABLE 3. PRIVATE BENEFIT EXTRACTION IN CONTROLLING
SHAREHOLDER REGIMES
43
MEXICO [ ITALY SWEDEN
PBC Measured by
Difference in 36% 29% 1%
Market Price
PBC Measured by
Control Block 34% 37% 7%
Premium
A recent study of Southeast Asian countries, also characterized as
having functionally bad law, provides empirical support for the rela-
tionship between the extent of private benefit extraction and both the
size of controlling shareholders' equity holdings and the size of the dif-
ference between equity ownership and control. In systems in which
controlling shareholder companies dominate, firm value increases with
the equity share of the largest shareholder and decreases with the size
of the difference between control rights and equity holdings.
44
Finally, the link between the level of private benefit extraction and
the quality of law appears in the results of another empirical strategy.
A recent study of large publicly traded companies in South Korea, a
38 Nenova, supra note 23, at 334-35 tbl. 3 .
39 Dyck & Zingales, supra note 35, at 551 tbl.II.
40 Nenova, supra note 23, at 334-35 tbl. 3.
41 Dyck & Zingales, supra note 35, at 551 tbl.II.
42 See id. at 59o; Nenova, supra note 23, at 348-49.
43 Dyck & Zingales, supra note 35, at 55I tbl.II; Nenova, supra note 23, at 334-35 tbl.3. Pri-
vate benefits of control in the United Kingdom and United States are less than i% whether meas-
ured by difference in market price or premium for control blocks. See Dyck & Zingales, supra
note 35, at 551 tbl.I; Nenova, supra note 23, at 334-35 tbl.3.
44 See Claessens et al., supra note 14.
16552006]
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
jurisdiction characterized by a controlling shareholder system, tracked
the impact of a legal reform mandating a majority of independent di-
rectors - that is, a reform that added a component of good law. Con-
trolling for measures of productivity and all other governance charac-
teristics, Professors Bernard Black, Hasung Jang, and Woochan Kim
found that large firms with a majority of outside directors, as required
by the change in South Korean law, experienced a 40% increase in
stock price.45 Of particular significance, the increase in stock price did
not result from increased firm productivity; companies did not become
more productive because of the increase in the number of independent
directors. Rather, the presence of a majority of outside directors ap-
pears to have caused the market to value more highly the company's
existing cash flow. The authors interpret their results as showing the
potential importance of outside directors - that is, functionally good
law - in controlling private benefit extraction by controlling share-
holders: "[Higher share prices] could be because outside directors may
help to control self-dealing by insiders, which historically has been a
serious problem in Korea. '46
In short, the controlling shareholder tradeoff framework implies a
different relationship between the quality of law and controlling
shareholder regimes. As a first step, this section demonstrates that the
quality of law distinguishes between types of controlling shareholder
regimes: functionally good law supports efficient controlling share-
holder systems, while functionally bad law supports inefficient control-
ling shareholder systems. As a second step, in section IV.B I show that
45 See Bernard S. Black, Hasung Jang & Woochan Kim, Does Corporate Governance Predict
Firms' Market Values? Evidence from Korea, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming Oct. 2o06)
(manuscript at 2), available at http://ssrn.com/abstracts=31 1275. The authors do not address why
the legal improvement actually worked. In a country like South Korea, where a controlling share-
holder structure is commonplace and private benefits of control are large, one would expect that
the new outside directors would not bring to their new job a commitment to constraining a pat-
tern that was commonplace in the business community. Thus, while the empirical support for the
important role of outside directors is strong, the explanation for that role remains interestingly
ambiguous.
46 Id. at 36. Making the same point a little differently, the authors state: "We do not find
strong evidence that better governed firms are more profitable or pay higher dividends. Instead,
investors appear to value the same earnings or the same current dividends more highly for better-
governed firms." Id. at 3. A similar result emerges in a recent study of market valuation of re-
search and development investments in Europe. Professors Bronwyn Hall and Raffaele Oriani
report that research and development investments by publicly traded Italian firms are not as
highly valued by the market as similar investments by German and French firms. Bronwyn H.
Hall & Raffaele Oriani, Does the Market Value R&D Investment by European Firms? Evidence
from a Panel of Manufacturing Firms in France, Germany, and Italy 4-5 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 10408, 2004), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/wlo4o8.
The authors attribute the difference to the potential for Italian controlling shareholders to appro-
priate the returns on the research and development investments. Id. at 5. The authors report
that they "found a positive relationship between R&D and market value only after controlling for
the eventual control by the major shareholder." Id. at 23.
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an efficient controlling shareholder system supports a diversity of
shareholder distributions, including both companies with a controlling
shareholder and companies with widely distributed shareholders, while
an inefficient controlling shareholder system only supports companies
with a controlling shareholder. As a third step, in section IV.C, I argue
that this understanding of the relationship between quality of law and
the character of a country's shareholder distribution undercuts the
usual distinction between widely held and controlling shareholder
regimes.
B. Functional Convergence and Diversity
of Shareholding Concentration
In an efficient controlling shareholder system, concentration of con-
trol operates as a cost-effective response to the managerial agency cost
problem. It is observed when the benefits of more focused monitoring
exceed the limited extraction of private benefits of control allowed in a
country with functionally good law. This represents a form of func-
tional convergence - within limits, different corporate governance
systems may solve the same monitoring problem through different
institutions.4 7
We can also expect diversity - different firm-level ownership pat-
terns - within the same efficient controlling shareholder system. The
efficiency advantages of having a controlling shareholder in a system
with good law - a system that minimizes the potential for private
benefit extraction - depend on the value gain that results from more
focused monitoring of management performance than is possible with
market-based techniques like independent directors and the market for
corporate control.48 Following Professors Harold Demsetz and Ken-
neth Lehn, the size of this value gain should in turn be sensitive to dif-
47 See Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency, 74 WASH. U. L.Q.
327, 332-33 (1996) [hereinafter Gilson, Economic Efficiency]; Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corpo-
rate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329, 332-33 (2001) [here-
inafter Gilson, Globalizing]. For example, a controlling shareholder's extraction of private bene-
fits of control can be constrained by rules against self-dealing, or by a mandatory bid rule that
forces the controlling shareholder to increase its equity ownership and thereby decrease the lure of
benefits distributed based on control rather than equity. Gilson, Globalizing, supra, at 336-37.
Note also how this account intersects with Professor Mark Roe's political account of concentrated
ownership. See ROE, supra note 4, at 16-25. Professor Roe explains why the politics of a particu-
lar country may lead to concentrated ownership. The efficiency account here helps explain why
concentrated ownership regimes in some countries succeed economically and those in others do
not - politics alone does not explain this difference.
48 The focus on the benefits of monitoring performance rather than merely the costs of private
benefit extraction distinguishes this discussion from that of Mike Burkart, Fausto Panunzi & An-
drei Shleifer, Family Firms, 58 J. FIN. 2167 (2003), which treats monitoring as extending princi-
pally to the consumption of private benefits by a nonowner manager.
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ferences in industry, companies, and controlling shareholders. 49 For
example, focused monitoring by a controlling shareholder may have no
comparative advantage over market-based monitoring when competi-
tion in the product market is sufficiently intense. In high technology
industries characterized by intense product market competition and
rapid technological change, we may observe companies with widely
distributed shareholdings even in an efficient controlling shareholder
system. These alternative monitoring techniques make even limited
private benefit extraction unnecessary to pay for more focused moni-
toring.50 Similarly, a firm's industrial organization may influence the
effectiveness of different monitoring systems. Large private benefits of
control require a mechanism to move large amounts of funds. The
easiest way, short of simple theft, is to use transfer pricing favorable to
the company in which the controlling shareholder has the larger equity
interest. A controlled group of firms whose businesses do not lend
themselves to intragroup supply transactions may credibly signal that
private benefits of control are low.s ' This technique would be espe-
cially important to a company in a bad law country that did not wish
to extract private benefits of control. A signal of this type depends on
industrial organization, not on the legal system.
Diversity also may result from differences between particular con-
trolling shareholders with respect to their taste for, or skill at, focused
monitoring. Such differences may tip the balance between a control-
ling shareholder distribution and a widely held shareholder distribu-
tion for a particular company, so that some diversity of shareholder
distribution may exist in an efficient controlling shareholder system
even within the same industry. Thus, the controlling shareholder
tradeoff framework predicts diversity of ownership structures within
49 See Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 375 (1983); Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership:
Causes and Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155 (1985) (finding breadth of shareholder distribu-
tion endogenous to the corporation's productive activity).
50 For discussion of product market competition as a monitoring mechanism, see Mark J. Roe,
Rents and Their Corporate Consequences, 53 STAN. L. REV 1463 (2ooi), and Dyck & Zingales,
supra note 35.
51 It is important to stress that the signal's credibility depends on the structure of the con-
trolled group rather than on the quality of a country's law. As a result, the technique is available
to companies in inefficient controlling shareholder regimes. While the absence of intragroup
transfers reduces the potential for private benefits of control, such transfers can also take place
through "bail-out" mergers among companies in which the controlling shareholder owns more of a
poorly performing target company than she does of the better performing acquiring company. See
Kee-Hong Bae, Jun-Koo Kang & Jin-Mo Kim, Tunneling or Value Added? Evidence from Merg-
ers by Korean Business Groups, 57 J. FIN. 2695 (2002) (adducing evidence of value transfers to
controlling shareholders in mergers within Korean business groups, or chaebols).
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an efficient controlling shareholder system. We should see companies
with both controlling shareholders and widely held shares.
52
In contrast, the controlling shareholder tradeoff framework predicts
much less diversity of ownership structures within an inefficient con-
trolling shareholder system. In the absence of constraints on pecuniary
private benefit extraction by a subsequent acquirer of control, an exist-
ing controlling shareholder cannot part with control without running
the risk of subsequent exploitation. The only viable strategy for a con-
trolling shareholder who lacks the taste for control would then be to
sell control to someone who would more effectively use that control,
rather than dissipate control through a public offering. To be sure,
this analysis does not rule out the presence of any widely held compa-
nies in an inefficient controlling shareholder regime. For example,
companies that begin as widely held, perhaps through privatization,
may survive, especially if the nature of the business restricts the oppor-
tunities for transferring value to a controlling shareholder. Nonethe-
less, we would expect there to be less diversity of shareholder distribu-
tion among companies in an inefficient controlling shareholder system
than in an efficient controlling shareholder system.
TABLE 4. DISTRIBUTION OF CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER AND
WIDELY HELD COMPANIES IN SWEDEN AND ITALY
5 3
CONTROLLING
SHAREHOLDER WIDELY HELD
(FAMILY)
Sweden 46.94% 39.18%
Italy 59.61% 12.98%
The available data support this prediction. Table 4 shows the per-
centage of widely held and family-controlled public corporations in
Sweden, an efficient controlling shareholder system, and in Italy, an
inefficient controlling shareholder system. While Sweden exhibits
rough parity between publicly traded companies with a controlling
shareholder and those with widely held shareholder structures, Italy
52 Part V takes up in greater detail the importance of differences in tastes among controlling
shareholders in an efficient controlling shareholder system.
53 Mara Faccio & Larry H.P Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corpora-
tions, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 365, 379 tbl.3 (2002).
16592006]
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
has close to five times more companies with controlling shareholders
than companies whose shares are widely held.5 4
C. Diversity and Recasting the Dichotomy Between Controlling
Shareholder and Widely Held Shareholder Systems
As I describe at the outset of this Article, the main theme of the
new comparative corporate governance debate has been the difference
between systems characterized by companies with controlling share-
holders and systems characterized by companies whose shares are
widely held. Recognizing that different distributions of shareholdings
coexist in functionally good law jurisdictions calls into question the
usefulness (and accuracy) of this central feature of the comparative
taxonomy. In this standard framework, the United States is treated as
the quintessential widely distributed system. However, the United
States also has a large number of corporations with controlling share-
holders. Most prominently as of late, both Google and Dreamworks
went public with "Swedish" capital structures - the founders retained
stock with many times the voting power of the class of common stock
sold to the public. 55 Recent research indicates that in 1998 there were
255 U.S. publicly traded companies with dual class stock,5 6 and that
34% of the S&P 500 companies have founder family equity ownership
with average holdings of i8%. 5 7 From this perspective, the United
States and Sweden no longer fall on opposite sides of a widely
held/controlling shareholder dichotomy, but represent points on a sin-
gle functionally good law continuum, with the placement of a jurisdic-
tion at any point in time reflecting the particular history of the juris-
diction and the current dynamics of industrial organization and capital
markets.
The idea that the appropriate taxonomic line is between countries
whose systems support companies with diverse patterns of share dis-
54 Participants in Italian workshops where an earlier draft of this Article was presented ex-
pressed skepticism that as many as 12.98% of Italian public companies were widely held. A
common argument was that the companies included in this number were either newly privatized
entities whose special structure prevented the aggregation of control from the outside, or compa-
nies in which there was a de facto controlling shareholder whose identity and control arrange-
ments did not appear in the public records.
55 See Dreamworks Animation SKG, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-i), at 89 (July 2 1,
2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/i2974oi/000095012304oo8590/
y98977svI.htm (stating that class B shares receive fifteen votes per share; class A and class C
shares receive one vote per share); Google Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-i), at 86 (Apr. 29,
2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/oooi 9 3 12504073 63 9 /dsi.htm(stating that class B shares receive ten votes per share; class A shares receive one vote per share).
56 Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, supra note 30, at 26 tbl. 3 .
57 Anderson, Mansi & Reeb, supra note ii, at 269; see also Morck & Yeung, supra note ii, at
392 tbl.i (reporting that 20% of large U.S. publicly traded firms have families with shareholdings
of 20% or greater).
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tributions on the one hand, and inefficient controlling shareholder sys-
tems on the other, finds further support in empirical research. Data
suggest that companies with controlling shareholders, and especially
family controlling shareholders, perform worse than comparable
widely held companies in inefficient controlling shareholder systems,
5 8
but better than comparable widely held companies in efficient control-
ling shareholder systems, at least when the family member involved in
the company's operations is the founder rather than an heir.
5 9 This
outcome is consistent with the controlling shareholder tradeoff devel-
oped in Part III. Where functionally good law constrains the level of
private benefits of control, minority shareholders benefit from a con-
trolling shareholder's more focused monitoring, leading to better per-
formance. Absent constraints on private benefits, minority sharehold-
ers are net worse off with a controlling shareholder. In countries in
which good law supports diverse patterns of shareholding, the cost of a
controlling shareholder increases when power shifts from the founder
to an heir. Yet this is not a problem of the legal system, but a regres-
sion to the mean in the talents of the founders' families.
V. COMPLICATING THE CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER
TAXONOMY: PECUNIARY VERSUS NONPECUNIARY
PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL
In Part IV, I extend the standard good law/bad law account of con-
trolling shareholder systems by complicating the taxonomy to distin-
guish between efficient and inefficient controlling shareholder systems.
I argue that an efficient controlling shareholder system has much more
in common with a widely held shareholder system than with an ineffi-
cient controlling shareholder system: both widely held and efficient
controlling shareholder systems support diversity in shareholder distri-
butions among companies, while an inefficient controlling shareholder
system does not. While this analysis puts the United States and Swe-
den on the same side of a functionally good/functionally bad law di-
vide rather than on opposite sides of a divide based on the prevalence
of controlling shareholders, there remains the question of the differ-
ences between the two systems. While we observe controlling share-
holders in both systems, publicly held Swedish companies are charac-
terized by controlling shareholders but U.S. public companies are
characterized by widely held shareholdings.
58 Morck, Wolfenzon & Yeung, supra note 13; Mara Faccio, Larry H.P. Lang & Leslie Young,
Dividends and Expropriation, 91 AM. EcON. REV. 54, 71-72 (2001).
59 See Anderson, Mansi & Reeb, supra note ii, at 265; Ronald C. Anderson & David M. Reeb,
Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500, 58 J. FIN.
1301, 1303 (2003); Morck, Wolfenzon & Yeung, supra note 13, at 15-17.
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At this point, however, the good law/bad law distinction has ex-
hausted its explanatory power. Within the spectrum of good law sys-
tems, we must look to other factors to explain the distribution of
shareholdings. To some extent, the characteristics of particular com-
panies may explain the distribution on a company-by-company, indus-
try-by-industry basis. In some industries and in some circumstances, a
controlling shareholder structure may be superior. In others, a widely
held shareholder structure may prove advantageous. Finally, the two
patterns of shareholdings may in some circumstances be functional
substitutes; that is, they may have equivalent monitoring capacity. In
the absence of extremely competitive markets and rapid technological
or market change, the domain over which the two patterns are substi-
tutes may be substantial.
In that circumstance, the ultimate outcome may be path dependent;
that is, the pattern that develops will turn on a set of initial conditions
driven by factors other than efficiency, and with the passage of time
will prove costly to change even if a different pattern later becomes
more efficient. 60 So, for example, recent studies of the origins of the
shareholding patterns in the United Kingdom and Sweden, both func-
tionally good law jurisdictions, stress local, nonefficiency factors as ex-
planations for each jurisdiction's path toward a widely held or control-
ling shareholder system. 61  Once on that path, given a system of
60 The application of a path dependency analysis to explain differences in industrial organiza-
tion dates to MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE
(1984), which sought to explain the U.S. pattern of mass production and the European pattern of
smaller team-oriented organization based on nonefficiency grounds. For applications in the cor-
porate governance context, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Depend-
ence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999).
61 See Julian R. Franks, Colin Mayer & Stefano Rossi, The Origination and Evolution of Own-
ership and Control (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 3822, 2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=4o 4 7 20 ("[T]he U.K. is fundamentally different from most other coun-
tries."); Peter Hdgfeldt, The History and Politics of Corporate Ownership in Sweden (European
Corporate Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 30/2003, 2004), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=44946o (finding Sweden's shareholding pattern to be the result of a coalition
between labor and family owners to socialize capital without public ownership). U.K. sharehold-
ing patterns resulted from the implicit contracts enforced by informal relations of trust and confi-
dence that encouraged participation of largely local outside investors. Franks, Mayer & Rossi,
supra; see also Brian R. Cheffins, Are Good Managers Required for a Separation of Ownership
and Control?, 13 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 59, (2004); Brian R. Cheffins, Law as Bedrock: The
Foundations of an Economy Dominated by Widely Held Public Companies, 23 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. I, 12-14 (2003) (arguing that institutions other than the legal system promoted the
widely held shareholding pattern in the United Kingdom). In both cases, the path dependency
story is quite different than the law and finance story. In the law and finance account, the exis-
tence of good law gives rise to widely held and efficient controlling shareholder systems. In these
path dependent accounts, the direction of causation is reversed, with initial serendipity giving rise
to a shareholding pattern that then demands good law. In the Swedish case, once politics allowed
the leading families to lock in control, a demand arose to assure that the locked-in controllers did
not steal. See Hogfeldt, supra. Professor John Coffee argues persuasively that this was the direc-
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functionally good law, there is little to cause a change. Both systems
support efficient production and will persist unless significant envi-
ronmental changes or, as we will see, firm-specific problems substan-
tially alter the balance. For example, in an efficient controlling share-
holder system the frictions that hold the pattern in place include
the lock-in effect of capital gains taxes on the sale of a controlling
position.62
A more important determinant, however, grows out of the fact that
even if functionally good law keeps the size of pecuniary private bene-
fits of control small, it may do little about nonpecuniary private bene-
fits. This distinction, I argue, is central to understanding the distribu-
tion of controlling shareholders and widely distributed shareholdings
in a good law system. In particular, persistence in shareholder distri-
bution in efficient controlling shareholder systems will strongly depend
on the persistence of controlling shareholder tastes. Thus, the next
step is to further complicate the controlling shareholder taxonomy by
looking more carefully at the concept of private benefits of control, a
central but to this point largely unexplored element of the analysis.
Consistent with the vast majority of the existing literature, I have not
as yet defined what I mean by private benefits of control. That now
needs to change. For present purposes, I want to make a quite simple
conceptual distinction, which may turn out to be somewhat less dis-
tinct in application, between two kinds of private benefits of control.
The first is pecuniary private benefits of control; that is, the nonpro-
portional flow of real resources from the company to the controlling
shareholder. A familiar example is tunneling accomplished through
intercompany dealings whose terms favor the company in which the
controlling shareholder has the larger equity stake. 63  The second is
nonpecuniary private benefits of control; that is, forms of psychic and
tion of causation in the United States as well. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Owner-
ship: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, iII YALE L.J.
1, 64-68 (2001). In Sweden, the account is consistent with Professor Roe's political theory; in the
United Kingdom, it is not. The lesson may be that every country's initial conditions are unique
even if the outcomes converge to one of a few patterns; politics affect the initial conditions in
some countries but not in others.
62 Capital gains taxes may reinforce the path dependency of controlling shareholder systems
by imposing a substantial charge on a controlling shareholder selling her long-held position even
if, in a world without taxes, changes in the economy would cause the controlling shareholder to
sell. For example, the desire to restructure the ownership distribution of its corporations led
Germany to debate elimination of the capital gains tax on the sale of long-held cross-holdings.
See Gilson, Globalizing, supra note 47, at 340-42.
63 See Simon Johnson et al., Tunneling, 90 AM. EcON. REV. 22, 22-23 (2000). In U.S. corpo-
rate law, the concept is similar (although termed "self-dealing"). The highest standard of judicial
review is reserved for a transaction in which a controlling shareholder receives something of value
to the exclusion and detriment of minority shareholders. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 28o
A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
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other benefits that, without more, involve no transfer of real company
resources and do not disproportionately dilute the value of the com-
pany's stock to a diversified investor. For example, control of a large
company in a small economy may provide a desirable social status for
the controlling family.64
The existing literature, both analytical and empirical, focuses al-
most exclusively on pecuniary benefits of control, although typically
without acknowledging the distinction between the two categories. 65
This can be seen most clearly in the empirical literature. Whether
measured by differences in value between high- and low-voting classes
of common stock, or by the premium paid for a control block relative
to the value of the entire firm, these amounts reflect the capitalized
value of real resources diverted to the controlling shareholder at the
expense of minority shareholders. 66 As we have seen, a number of
studies show that the market values the same cash flows differently
when produced by a company with an inefficient controlling share-
holder as opposed to an efficient controlling shareholder.67 The differ-
ence is pecuniary private benefits of control.
Focusing on pecuniary private benefits of control, however, raises a
real quandary. The empirical evidence shows very low pecuniary pri-
vate benefits in efficient controlling shareholder systems. But holding
a controlling position imposes costs in illiquidity and lack of diversifi-
cation on the controlling shareholder, in addition to the actual cost of
monitoring. Why then do we ever observe controlling shareholders in
countries with functionally good law - namely, those with widely held
and efficient controlling shareholder regimes - if controlling share-
holders can extract only limited amounts of pecuniary private benefits
of control? Unlike in an inefficient controlling shareholder system, in
this system controlling shareholders are free to sell their positions
without fear of exploitation by a new controller. The answer lies in
the realm of nonpecuniary private benefits of control. Almost tauto-
logically, nonpecuniary benefits must play a prominent role in regimes
in which functionally good law keeps pecuniary private benefits low.
64 A good analogy could be made to the difference between common values and private values
in the economics of auctions. In a common value auction, the asset has the same value to all bid-
ders. In a private value auction, the asset's value depends on the bidder. See R. Preston McAfee
& John McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, 25 J. EcON. LITERATURE 699, 704-05 (1987).
65 Professors Dyck and Zingales, supra note 35, at 542, are notable in that they recognize the
difference between the two categories. Their principal aim, however, is only to show the impor-
tance of pecuniary private benefits of control - "that not all private benefits are psychic" -
rather than to examine the implications of psychic benefits. Id. at 59o.
66 See supra pp. 1654-55.
67 See supra pp. 1654-55. Professors Black, Jang, and Kim, supra note 45, at 9, provide the
best example. The same cash flows increase firm market value as a result of an improvement in
law that reduces the potential for controlling shareholders to capture pecuniary private benefits.
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While a comprehensive exploration of nonpecuniary private bene-
fits of control requires considerably more attention than I can devote
here, 68 a hypothetical setting can serve to motivate the analysis. Sup-
pose that a controlling family has a net worth of $4 billion, all invested
in the controlled firm. What does the family's utility function look
like? What does the family maximize? Suppose that a potential ac-
quirer will pay a $300 million premium for the family's controlling in-
terest because the acquirer can increase the company's productivity or
capture synergies. The family confronts a tradeoff: control of a major
industrial company versus a 7.5% increase in family wealth. Is main-
taining the role of leading industrialists in a country, with the social
and political access associated with that role, worth more than addi-
tional wealth at a point where decreasing marginal returns to wealth
must surely have set in?69
To generalize the intuition, the existence of private benefits of con-
trol means that for the controlling shareholder the separation theorem
does not apply; that is, the controlling shareholder's utility is affected
by company decisions in ways other than through the decisions' im-
pact on the company's stock price. 70 Thus, maximizing the controlling
shareholder's utility may mean something other than maximizing the
value of the corporation. As with complicating the concept of a con-
trolling shareholder in Part IV, complicating the concept of private
benefits of control has a number of interesting implications.
A. Explaining the Difference Between the United States and Sweden
The distinction between pecuniary and nonpecuniary private bene-
fits of control helps explain the continuing differences between the in-
cidence of controlling shareholders in the United States and Sweden.
The United States is characterized by widely held shareholder distri-
butions, while Sweden is characterized by controlling shareholder dis-
tributions, even though in both countries functionally good law sup-
ports, and we observe, both patterns of shareholdings. Controlling
68 For example, nonpecuniary private benefits of control may sometimes provide both psychic
benefits to the controlling shareholder and real benefits to the company (and hence to the minority
shareholders). Political influence is a good illustration. The ability to influence political action
can provide great personal benefits. At the same time, that influence can also lead to the adoption
of government policies beneficial to the company. Data from Thailand, for example, support this
dual function. After company executives become high political officials, corporate performance
improves relative to that of "unconnected" companies. See Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakan-
tang, supra note 2 1.
69 Professor Bruno Frey's work has been most prominent in stressing the importance of con-
sidering nonpecuniary benefits in economic analysis. See BRUNO S. FREY, NOT JUST FOR THE
MONEY: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF PERSONAL MOTIVATION (997).
70 See Ronald J. Gilson, Separation and the Function of Corporation Law, 2 BERKELEY Bus.
L.J. 141 (2005) (discussing the role of the separation theorem in corporate law).
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shareholders in countries with good law are compensated for the extra
costs of their controlling position through nonpecuniary private bene-
fits of control. Thus, the different patterns of shareholdings in the two
countries should depend on the potential for such nonpecuniary
benefits.
A first observation turns on the relative size of the two economies.
Because the Swedish economy is relatively small, a group of fifteen
families was sufficient to dominate. Being one of fifteen leading fami-
lies provides a social and political position for which there is no coun-
terpart in the United States, whose economy is simply too large for a
small number of families to play a comparable national role. Neither
Warren Buffett nor Bill Gates, for example, looks like an American
version of the Swedish Wallenbergs. Thus, in the United States non-
pecuniary private benefits of control are likely to be generally smaller
and local rather than national, which suggests that we should observe
fewer companies with controlling shareholders. The lower level of
nonpecuniary benefits of control should also increase the rate at which
controlling shareholders and their heirs dissipate control. Entrepre-
neurial companies making an initial public offering almost always
have a controlling shareholder. As we see in section VB, the rate of
reduction in control by the entrepreneurs' heirs increases as the level
of nonpecuniary benefits goes down.
A second observation builds on the first. We should observe con-
trolling shareholders in those U.S. industries in which nonpecuniary
private benefits of control are likely to be most pronounced. So, for
example, one would expect to find controlling shareholders in major
newspaper companies because running a major national newspaper
puts one at the center of major public and cultural issues, with the po-
tential to influence the outcome. And in fact, companies that operate
the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Wall Street Journal
have controlling shareholders.71 Studies report that a dual class capi-
tal structure like that of Dreamworks,7 2 designed to facilitate mainte-
nance of control without a controlling share of a company's equity,
71 See The Washington Post Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14 A), at 3, io (Mar. 25, 2005),
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/datal104889/oooi 188112o5ooo53o/tdefI4a-487 i.txt
(stating that all class A shares are owned by the descendants of Katharine Graham, who together
name seven of ten directors); Dow Jones & Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14 A), at 36 (Mar. 18,
2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/29924/OOOI9312505054765/ddefI4a.
htm (stating that family-controlled class B common stock has ten votes per share and common
stock has one vote per share); The New York Times Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule I4 A), at iii, 4
(Mar. ii, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/7169I/0001O47469o5oo6126/
a2 i49185zdefi4a.htm (indicating that family-controlled class B common stock selects nine of four-
teen directors).
72 See supra p. 166o.
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disproportionately occurs in the printing, publishing, and communica-
tions industries, as well as in media firms 73 and sports teams.
74
Thus, the incidence of controlling shareholders in the United States
and Sweden, countries in which functionally good law supports both
widely held and controlling shareholder distributions, reflects not only
the serendipity of where the two countries started,75 but the potential
for continuing nonpecuniary private benefits of control as well.
B. Macroeconomic Implications of Nonpecuniary
Private Benefits of Control
The empirical evidence supports the proposition that minority
shareholders are not uniquely disadvantaged in an efficient controlling
shareholder system. Good law keeps diversion of pecuniary private
benefits of control low and, in a reasonably efficient stock market, the
costs of these payments for focused monitoring, as well as the risk that
the talent of future generations of managers will regress to the mean,
will be priced. Unlike in inefficient controlling shareholder systems,
here minority shareholders are playing in a basically fair game.
The inquiry, however, does not end with the position of minority
shareholders. The significant role for nonpecuniary private benefits of
control has macroeconomic effects that impact a country as a whole. I
take up three such situations.
Consider first the failure of separation just discussed. Some con-
trolling shareholders' preferences may simply reflect misjudgment or
overconfidence. To the extent that the controlling shareholder or her
heirs wish to go on directly managing the company, there may be a
powerful inclination to overinvest in the company's existing businesses
- those with which the family manager is more comfortable - even
though other opportunities that require different managerial skills may
offer higher returns. Alternatively, the controlling shareholder may
prefer to enter new businesses about which she knows little but that
are alluring personally; the transformation of the businesses in which
companies associated with the Bronfman family engaged - from liq-
uor and oil to entertainment - is an example.7 6 To the extent these
73 Examples include most large U.S. cable television companies. Gompers, Ishii & Metrick,
supra note 30, at 9-1o, 25 tbl.2.
74 See John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89
CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1343 & n.156 (2OOl); Demsetz & Lehn, supra note 49, at 1168-71; Laura
Casares Field, Control Considerations of Newly Public Firms: The Implementation of Antitake-
over Provisions and Dual Class Shares Before the IPO 19, 40 tbl.8 (Feb. io, 1999) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http:l/www.ssrn.com/abstract= 150488.
75 See supra p. 1662.
76 Prior to 1981, Seagram Company Ltd. produced alcoholic beverages. In a series of transac-
tions beginning in i98i, the company diversified, ending up as the largest (24.2%) shareholder of
DuPont. In 1995, at the initiative of the next generation of the controlling Bronfman family, Sea-
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actions are motivated by nonpecuniary benefits of control, the fact that
they reduce value may matter a great deal to the country as a whole
even if minority shareholders accurately predict the controlling fam-
ily's preferences and abilities.
A second implication of the failure of separation relates to the like-
lihood of declining skills in successive generations of family managers
- the operation of the gravity of generations. Even if the risk of un-
derperformance over time is priced, that underperformance still oper-
ates as a drag on the economy through the misallocation of resources.
Recent empirical work shows that per capita GDP is highly and sig-
nificantly negatively correlated with the extent of family control over a
country's private sector.77 The underperformance appears to worsen
as control passes from founding entrepreneur to heir. Professors Ran-
dall Morck, Daniel Wolfenzon, and Bernard Yeung report that Cana-
dian "heir controlled firms are less profitable than otherwise compara-
ble firms in the U.S. and in Canada. '78  Data for Sweden, a
functionally good law jurisdiction, appear consistent. Minority share
discounts in Swedish family complexes seem related to factors other
than pecuniary private benefits of control.79
The U.S. data concerning the impact of the shift from founder to
heir are more mixed. While an early study suggested that family-
owned firms performed worse than widely held firms,80 recent work is
more tentative; it suggests that family-controlled firms may outperform
nonfamily-controlled ones, but that the advantage disappears when the
heir serves as CEO (although performance remains no worse than that
of nonfamily firms).8 ' This description is consistent with an efficient
gram sold its DuPont stock back to DuPont and used the proceeds to enter the entertainment
business by buying, among other companies, MCA, the owner of Universal Studios. See Anthony
Bianco, Deal Time at Seagram, Bus. WK., June 26, 2ooo, at 58, 61, 64.
77 Morck & Yeung, supra note ii, at 393, 394 tbl.2.
78 Morck, Wolfenzon & Yeung, supra note 13, at 6. The result generalizes: countries in which
the billionaire heirs' wealth is large relative to GDP grow more slowly than those in which the
wealth of the founders is large relative to GDP. Randall K. Morck, David A. Strangelano & Ber-
nard Yeung, Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control, and Economic Growth: The Canadian Dis-
ease?, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 319, 319 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000).
79 See Martin Holmen & John D. Knopf, Minority Shareholder Protections and the Private
Benefits of Control for Swedish Mergers, 39 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 167, 190 (2004)
(basing the evidence on intragroup mergers within family-controlled pyramids); Martin Holmhn &
Peter Htigfeldt, Pyramidal Discounts: Tunneling or Agency Costs? 9 (European Corporate Gov-
ernance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 73/2005, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
6765o6 (same).
80 See Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Management Ownership and Mar-
ket Valuation, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 293, 311 (1988) (concluding that performance of older firms is
worse when the firm is run by a member of the founding family).
81 See Ronald C. Anderson & David M. Reeb, Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Per-
formance: Evidence from the S&P 500, 58 J. FIN. 1301, 1303 (2003); see also Ronald C. Anderson
& David M. Reeb, Founding-Family Ownership, Corporate Diversification, and Firm Leverage, 46
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controlling shareholder structure that loses its advantage, but does not
deteriorate substantially, when management passes to the next genera-
tion. There is a plausible explanation for the difference in perform-
ance - both overall and with respect to the slower deterioration after
management shifts from founder to heir - between family-controlled
and widely held companies in the United States and controlling share-
holder firms in other countries with functionally good law (countries
that support both widely held and controlling shareholder distribu-
tions). The United States, unlike for example Canada or Sweden, is
not characterized by pyramid ownership structures through which
families control multiple levels of firms. Controlling families in the
United States typically do not leverage their equity to control more
than one company.8 2 Thus, outside the United States, the effect of less
skilled heirs managing a company is both exacerbated by the greater
difficulty of running a diversified company and multiplied over a lar-
ger asset base.
A final implication may be the most significant. As Part IV sug-
gests, efficient controlling shareholder systems have greater diversity in
patterns of shareholder distribution. Part of this diversity is positive
- driven by the fit between particular companies and industries on
the one hand, and the monitoring techniques associated with control-
ling shareholder or widely held shareholder distributions on the other.
But part of this diversity may be negative - reflecting the absence of
market pressures on controlling shareholders to respond to changes in
the external economic environment and of market mechanisms to im-
pose those changes from the outside when the controlling shareholder
fails to respond.
The insulation of the controlling shareholder from market pressure
is not always bad. As I have argued previously, "institutions matter
when they fit existing industrial technology."8 3 The stability that a
controlling shareholder can provide may be quite effective when, as
with the happy match between Japanese corporate governance and in-
dustrial organization over a large part of the post-War period, it sup-
ports firm- and team-specific worker human capital investment, and
the industry experiences largely linear technological change. s4  The
converse, however, is also true: "[I]nstitutions matter when they do not
fit with the industrial technology demanded in a state of the world dif-
J. L. & ECON. 653, 679 (2003) (demonstrating that U.S. family-controlled firms are less diversified
than widely held firms).
82 Morck, Wolfenzon & Yeung, supra note 13, at 6 ("[B]lock holders in the US seldom control
more than one corporation.").
83 Gilson, supra note 6, at 34I.
84 See Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Lifetime Employment: Labor Peace and the Evolution
of Japanese Corporate Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 508, 508 (1999).
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ferent from that which gave rise to the governance institutions in the
first place. '85  When companies and industries must adapt quickly to
large and abrupt changes in the economic environment, the stability
associated with an efficient controlling shareholder system becomes a
barrier to necessary adaptation; in this circumstance, a widely held
shareholder system, with control open to the market, likely will be
more efficient. 86 In particular, a widely held shareholder system facili-
tates a dynamic cycle between public and private ownership that po-
lices adaptivity. When a public company experiences managerial un-
derperformance, the private equity market can mount an acquisition
through buyout funds that will put into place a highly incentivized, in-
tensively monitored governance structure that is suited to fixing the
problem. Then, because the buyout funds typically must liquidate af-
ter ten years, the now "fixed" company is taken public again to allow
the distribution of liquid assets to the buyout fund's investors.,7 If it is
difficult to design a system with both the adaptivity of a widely held
shareholder system and the stability of an efficient controlling share-
holder system, the choice will depend on one's predictions of the fu-
ture: will the environment be one that favors adaptation or stability?
The public/private dynamic found in widely held controlling share-
holder systems may serve to balance this tradeoff.
C. Ameliorating Influence I: The Potential Instability of Efficient
Controlling Shareholder Systems
Some factors work to ameliorate an efficient controlling share-
holder system's insulation from market pressures for change. Precisely
because nonpecuniary private benefits are idiosyncratic to the particu-
lar controlling shareholder and because the identities of controlling
shareholders change with generations, it is plausible to expect changes
in the value of the nonpecuniary private benefits of control over time,
whether from lifecycle changes, increased wealth within a single gen-
eration, or intergenerational changes in tastes or abilities. At some
point, the wealth gain from adaptation reflected in a large acquisition
85 Gilson, supra note 6, at 341.
86 See id. at 336-38; Ronald J. Gilson, The Political Ecology of Takeovers: Thoughts on Har-
monizing the European Corporate Governance Environment, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. ii (1992).
This concern with the barriers to adaptation in efficient controlling shareholder systems recently
has received broader attention. See, e.g., HANS TSON SODERSTROM ET AL., SNS ECONOMIC
POLICY GROUP REPORT 2003: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE
(Hans Tson Soderstrom ed., 2003); Raghuram Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Banks and Markets: The
Changing Character of European Finance (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
9595, 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9595.
87 See generally RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 398-453 (2d ed. 1995) (describing the structure and operation of
private buyout funds).
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premium, or an increase in market value from giving up control and
hiring professional managers, outweighs the nonpecuniary private
benefits of control that a controlling shareholder experiences - a proc-
ess that can be expected to accelerate as succeeding generations experi-
ence greater regression to the mean in managerial skills8 8 and as the
number of family members actively involved in the company increases.
As a result, efficient controlling shareholder systems will tend to
deteriorate simply from the gravity of generations. For example, the
recent SNS Economic Policy Group report notes with respect to Swe-
den that "[o]nly a few of the 'fifteen families' who used to dominate
Swedish industry remain major owners in a position of control. '89 To
the extent that the deterioration is driven by a control premium that
increases with the value that would result from change, the timing of
the deterioration at least may be influenced in the direction of effi-
ciency: the greater the efficiency gain from adaptation, the faster the
deterioration of the controlling shareholder system. 90
88 See Francesco Caselli & Nicola Gennaioli, Dynastic Management (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 9442, 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9442 (model-
ing inefficiency of family control as a function in part of the degree of inheritability of talent
across generations).
89 SODERSTROM ET AL., supra note 86, at 13. Professor Peter Hogfeldt describes the extent
to which the Wallenberg group in Sweden recently has withdrawn control from a significant
number of companies. Hhgfeldt, supra note 61, at 14-15. Speaking of the change in the role of
the Wallenberg group, Sweden's deputy finance minister recently described a secular reduction in
their and other Swedish family groups:
They [the Wallenbergs] have been enormously important, no doubt. They continue to be
quite important, but less important than they were .... They are increasingly being
challenged by other power centres in the Swedish economy. The dynastic model is
unlikely to survive in the years and decades ahead, particularly with the amount of
European integration we are now seeing and the efforts to reach a level playing field in
the European economy.
Christopher Brown-Humes, Can the Next Wallenberg Generation Maintain Its Status and Influ-
ence?, FIN. TIMES (London), July 12, 2004, at 13 (alteration and omission in original) (quoting
Gunnar Lund) (internal quotation marks omitted). The recent reduction of the disparity in voting
rights between stock classes in the Wallenberg company Ericsson, from a ratio of iooo to i to a
ratio of io to I, reflects this process. See Press Release, Ericsson, The Work Group Presents a
Proposal To Reduce the Differences in Voting Rights in Ericsson to i:io (Feb. 19, 2004), available
at http://www.ericsson.com/press/2oo4o219-07463o.html. As a result, the voting rights of Wallen-
berg entities have been reduced to around 40%. See H6gfeldt, supra note 61, at 15. Daniel Frist-
edt and Sven-Ivan Sundqvist show that seven of the ten largest Swedish shareholders are non-
family institutions like pension and mutual funds. DANIEL FRISTEDT & SVEN-IVAN SUND-
QVIST, OWNERS AND POWER IN SWEDEN'S LISTED COMPANIES 10 (2004). Leading Swedish
corporate lawyers confirmed this point anecdotally by lightly remarking that Sweden is still con-
trolled by fifteen people, but these people are now heads of pension funds rather than heads of
families. Interview with Gunnar Nord, Robert OhIsson, and Rolf Skog, in Visby, Swed. (May
2004).
90 At the same time, the political forces that in Professor Mark Roe's account lead to stable
concentrated shareholdings, see ROE, supra note 4, may be declining in importance as a result of
globalization and the resulting decrease in labor influence. See Brown-Humes, supra note 89.
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This assessment is consistent with another recent characteristic of
the Swedish system. Despite the dominant role of controlling share-
holders, Sweden has experienced a high level of takeovers, by defini-
tion friendly. Professor Rolf Skog reports that of the 245 Swedish
listed companies that were taken over between 199o and 2002, 157 or
64% had dual class stock with different voting rights, roughly the
same percentage as companies with dual class stock among all listed
companies.91  Whether a company had a controlling shareholder,
therefore, appeared not to affect the incidence of corporate takeovers.
This suggests that the situations in which the size of the offered pre-
mium exceeds the controlling shareholder's nonpecuniary benefits of
control may track the situations that give rise to takeovers more
generally.
D. Ameliorating Influence II: Public Pressure on Efficient
Controlling Shareholders
There is reason to think that external pressure may operate as a
constraint on controlling shareholders. Academics have considered the
role of public opinion primarily as a force for reducing pecuniary pri-
vate benefits of control in bad law countries, essentially as a substitute
for an effective legal system. 9 Public opinion-driven policing of non-
pecuniary private benefits of control, however, may prove more diffi-
cult. For public opinion to operate as a constraint, two conditions are
necessary (although not necessarily sufficient). First, the controlling
shareholder's conduct must be observable to the public, which is why
the most promising empirical study of the role of public opinion as a
constraint on private benefits of control uses newspaper circulation as
a measure of public opinion. 93 Second, and for present purposes more
difficult, there must be a shared public conception that the observed
behavior is wrong. This is plausible with respect to pecuniary private
benefits of control - the principle that "thou shalt not steal" is surely
widely shared, and diversion of company cash flows for the benefit of
a controlling shareholder may well be understood as stealing. How-
ever, the range of behaviors that provides nonpecuniary private bene-
fits of control may lack the same public consensus. Thus, the extent to
which public opinion acts as a constraint on nonpecuniary private
benefits of control likely is quite sensitive to the particular manifesta-
tion of the private benefit and to local culture. For example, the extent
91 Skog, supra note 12, at 15.
92 For example, see Professors Dyck and Zingales, who use the importance of newspapers (cir-
culation per ioo,ooo inhabitants) as a measure of the force of public opinion in a jurisdiction.
Dyck & Zingales, supra note 35, at 582-86. They find that one standard deviation increase in cir-
culation reduces the value of control measured by pecuniary private benefits by 6.4%. See id.
93 Id. at 582.
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to which nepotism is viewed as improper may differ widely among
jurisdictions.
More importantly, the characteristics that give rise to nonpecuniary
private benefits of control are plainly culturally influenced. For exam-
ple, the maintenance of family control - the private benefit of being a
leading family - may be more highly valued in Asia than it is in the
United States. Thus, Asian controlling shareholders may be willing to
forgo more potential value to keep control in the family, and the public
may be sympathetic to that preference, with the result that a control-
ling shareholder pattern may persist longer in Asian than in Western
countries. To be sure, culture and economics are related in compli-
cated ways. In inefficient controlling shareholder systems, a cultural
attribute that assigns great value to the nonpecuniary private benefit
of maintaining family control reinforces the economic motivation to
maintain control to avoid being exploited later as a noncontrolling
shareholder. Conversely, the continued globalization of commerce,
which increases the opportunity cost of maintaining family control
through forced competition with more efficiently organized companies,
will inevitably erode the cultural assessment of the value of control.
As yet, however, we know very little about the dynamics of the inter-
action between culture and economics in determining the sources and
relative value of nonpecuniary private benefits of control.
VI. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
In this Article, I argue that a good deal can be learned by looking
at the usual taxonomy of controlling shareholders through the frame-
work of the controlling shareholder tradeoff: focused monitoring in re-
turn for some private benefits of control and at a cost in speed of ad-
aptation. In particular, the framework highlights the value of distin-
guishing between efficient and inefficient controlling shareholder sys-
tems, and between pecuniary and nonpecuniary private benefits of
control. Together, the two distinctions reframe the taxonomy of share-
holder distribution to distinguish between regimes that support com-
panies with a diversity of shareholder distributions and regimes that
support only companies with a controlling shareholder. I now con-
clude by briefly considering two policy implications - the first broad,
the second narrow - that are suggested by this more complicated con-
trolling shareholder taxonomy.
A. Eliminating Inefficient Controlling Shareholder Systems:
Better Law or More Market Exposure?
One straightforward implication of a more complicated taxonomy
is the need to eliminate inefficient controlling shareholder systems.
This can be attempted by three different, but not mutually inconsis-
tent, strategies. First, an inefficient system can be attacked directly by
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improving the legal system to constrain pecuniary private benefits of
control to levels that, net of these costs, leave minority shareholders
better off as a result of focused monitoring. At that point, the country
will have transformed into an efficient controlling shareholder system
that is supported by nonpecuniary private benefits of control, which
are subject to the ameliorating influences discussed in Part V. Second,
an inefficient system can be attacked indirectly by changing legal rules
and supporting institutions to increase the exposure of control to the
market. Third, improved access to global capital markets may in
some circumstances provide a self-correcting market solution for inef-
ficient controlling shareholder systems, acting to dissipate a controlling
shareholder's position in just those circumstances when the social costs
of underperformance are the greatest.
I. Improving the Legal System. - Improving the legal system gen-
erally involves eliminating deficiencies in three areas: the standards
that make significant pecuniary private benefits of control unlawful;
the disclosure process that allows those with the power to enforce the
legal standards to observe pecuniary private benefits of control; and
the public and private enforcement mechanisms available to prosecute
violations. This process can be slow, and it certainly requires a politi-
cal moment when the public perception of the need for reform out-
weighs the influence of entrenched inefficient controlling shareholders,
but there is some evidence that it can happen. 94
Recent reform in Italy may be a case in point. Recall that empiri-
cal studies show that in Italy private benefits of control amount to as
much as 29% to 37% of total firm value. 95  In 1998, Italy adopted leg-
islation that made it significantly easier for minority shareholders to
pursue derivative litigation against management appointed by a con-
trolling shareholder. 96 Professors Dyck and Zingales report a dramatic
drop in the level of pecuniary private benefits of control after the re-
form, although the results can only be suggestive given the very small
sample. 9 7  Effective January I, 2004, Italy implemented substantial
94 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of ii, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.), provides an example of how legal reform can increase
constraints on pecuniary private benefits of control even in a country with functionally good law.
The statute's focus on internal controls and on officer certification, coupled with increased penal-
ties and rigorous enforcement, makes the kind of transfers associated with pecuniary private
benefits of control much more difficult.
95 See supra pp. r654-55.
96 Article 129 of Decree-Law No. 58, Feb. 24, 1998, Gazz. Uff. No. 71, Mar. 26, 1998, allows
shareholders with at least 5 % of the outstanding stock to sue the directors on behalf of the corpo-
ration. Id.; see also Marco Ventoruzzo, Experiments in Comparative Corporate Law: The Recent
Italian Reform and the Dubious Virtues of a Market for Rules in the Absence of Effective Regula-
tory Competition, 4o TEx. INT'L L.J. 113, 140 (2004).
97 Dyck & Zingales, supra note 35, at 570. Unfortunately, the Dyck and Zingales sample con-
tains only six observations of a controlling shareholder block sale before the 1998 reform, and
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additional reforms to its legislation governing groups of companies
dominated by a controlling shareholder.98 In addition to expanding
the circumstances in which voting control imposes liability on the con-
trolling shareholder for mismanagement, the legislation imposes
broader disclosure obligations for transactions with the controlling
shareholder.99 With respect to decisions actually influenced by the
controlling shareholder, the legislation requires disclosure of the rea-
sons behind such decisions.100 While these reforms do respond to the
demands of substantive standards and disclosure necessary to a good
law regime, it remains uncertain whether the need for strong enforce-
ment will be met. In the end, the effectiveness of enforcement depends
on matters of civil procedure and judicial efficiency, about which
commentators have expressed reservations. 10 1  Further, the enforce-
ment effect of nonjudicial institutions, like the public press, depends
on cultural beliefs regarding whether pecuniary private benefits of
control are improper.
Notwithstanding the potentially important but still uncertain ef-
forts in Italy, legal reform may move quite slowly in some countries.
As may turn out to be the case in Italy, even if legislation states stan-
dards of conduct more aggressively and requires more effective disclo-
sure, reform may still founder on the enforcement process.1 0 2  If, for
example, a country lacks a sophisticated, independent, and effective
court system, it may be a time-consuming process to create one, even if
political barriers can be overcome. Without effective enforcement,
improved standards and tougher disclosure rules are unlikely to be
enough.
only two after the reform. Id. at 570 n.2 2. Additionally, Professor Marco Ventoruzzo states that
the new power to bring a derivative suit had "never been used" as of late 2004. Ventoruzzo, supra
note 96, at 141.
98 Decree-Law No. 6, Jan. 17, 2003, Gazz. Uff. No. 17, Jan. 22, 2003; see also Umberto Tom-
bari, The New Italian Company Law: An Emerging European Model? (May 2003) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
99 See Guido Ferrarini, Paolo Giudici & Mario Stella Richter, Company Law Reform in Italy:
Real Progress?, 69 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES
PRIVATRECHT 658, 692 (2005) (F.R.G.).
100 Id.
101 See id.
102 Professors Guido Ferrarini and Paolo Giudici make this point explicitly with respect to the
Parmalat scandal:
As we show, Italian substantive rules cannot be blamed for what happened. Indeed, we
argue ... that the existing Italian substantive rules that were in place during Parmalat's
last decade were sufficient and, somewhat surprisingly, were even more severe than
those in the US. If gatekeepers were undeterred, do not blame Italian substantive rules,
blame enforcement.
Guido Ferrarini & Paolo Giudici, Financial Scandals and the Role of Private Enforcement: The
Parmalat Case 3 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 40/2005, 2005),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=730403.
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2. Increasing Exposure of Control to the Market. - In these cases,
the second strategy - legal reform that exposes controlling positions to
the market - may be more effective. Here, the most obvious example
is the mandatory breakthrough rule proposed by the Winter Report
and partially reflected in the 2002 Commission draft of the Thirteenth
Directive.103 Under the Winter Report's proposal, if a bidder secures
75% of the target's equity, then the extra votes of a high-voting class
would be ignored for such things as election of directors.10 4 The effect
of the rule would be to sharply limit the extent to which a controlling
shareholder could use certain devices to lever its equity into control; a
minimum of 25% of the equity value plus one share would be neces-
sary to command a majority of the vote. 10 5 Importantly, however, the
coverage of the proposed breakthrough rule is only partial. Many
European companies' controlling shareholder structures are based on
devices that heavily leverage the controlling shareholder's equity
through the use of pyramids instead of or in addition to dual class
common stock or other voting rules that are the object of the break-
through proposal. Pyramidal structures would not be affected by the
proposed rule, 106 thereby reducing its impact even if the Thirteenth
Directive had fully followed the Winter Report's recommendation.
For present purposes, the proposed breakthrough rule had two im-
portant characteristics. First, it was to be imposed on a European
level, thereby at least partially bypassing the political obstacle of con-
trolling shareholder influence over a particular country's legislature. 07
The second characteristic is more speculative. The Thirteenth Di-
rective as imagined by the Winter Report might have had the interest-
ing effect of a quite different impact on inefficient and efficient con-
trolling shareholder systems. For inefficient systems, control is opened
up to widely held corporate bidders, who will be in a position to pur-
chase 75% of the equity at a premium that shares the gains from
eliminating pecuniary private benefits of control with minority share-
holders - much like shareholders participated in the gains resulting
103 Comm'n of the European Cmtys., High Level Group of Company Law Experts, Report of
the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to Takeover Bids, at 29-36 (Jan.
10, 2002) (prepared by Jaap Winter et al.), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=315322.
104 The Commission's proposed directive prohibited the operation of restrictions on the number
of votes a shareholder could cast regardless of the number of shares owned (voting caps), but did
not endorse the Winter Report's proposed limit on multiple classes of voting shares with different
voting rights - the breakthrough rule. See Comm'n of the European Cmtys., Proposal for a Di-
rective of the European Parliament and of the Council on Takeover Bids, at 25-2 6, COM (2002)
534 final (Oct. 2, 2002), available at http://europa.eu.inteur-lex/en/com/pdf/2002/comsoo2_
0534enoi.pdf.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 To be sure, individual states can and do drag their feet on adopting legislation implementing
a directive.
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from i98os-style takeovers motivated by the desire to eliminate the
misuse of free cash flow. 10 8 In the free cash flow-motivated takeover,
the bidder shared the gains from redeploying free cash flow through
the premium paid for the target's stock; the remainder went to the ac-
quirer through improved target performance. In an inefficient control-
ling shareholder takeover, the bidder would share the gains from
eliminating pecuniary private benefits of control through the premium
paid for 75% of the company's equity.10 9
In contrast, the breakthrough rule's threat to control in efficient
controlling shareholder systems would be substantially more muted.
Because of the low level of pecuniary private benefits of control in an
efficient controlling shareholder system, there would be no easy source
of premiums for would-be bidders. To be sure, controlling sharehold-
ers would sometimes have to increase their equity ownership to 25%
plus one share to protect control, thereby increasing the control costs
of focused monitoring and in particular circumstances shifting the out-
come of the controlling shareholder tradeoff, but European Union-
wide, the balance would seem to be positive.
3. The Operation of the Capital Market To Dissipate a Controlling
Position. - That leaves the third, market-based approach to improv-
ing the operation of inefficient controlling shareholder systems. In
these systems, poorly managed companies and those from whom con-
trolling shareholders have siphoned pecuniary private benefits of con-
trol may require additional capital, especially to respond to the global-
ization of their markets and to new, more efficient foreign competitors.
For these companies, internally generated funds will be insufficient,
requiring recourse to the capital market. In this context, external sup-
pliers of debt or equity can be expected to insist on a means to dissi-
pate the controlling shareholder's influence if poor performance
threatens the new investment. I suggested the use of performance-
based conversion as a means of constraining controlling shareholders
four years ago.' 10 Just such a technique was used recently with re-
spect to a prominent controlling shareholder in Italy. In order to raise
$3 billion from Italy's largest banks to finance a 2002 restructuring,
108 See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 87, at 398-453.
109 The threat of a hostile bid, the strategy of which is to reduce target company pecuniary pri-
vate benefits of control, may give rise to a virtuous cycle. For controlling shareholders who wish
to maintain control and retain at least nonpecuniary private benefits, the best strategy may be to
eliminate pecuniary private benefits themselves before the hostile takeover comes. This was the
U.S. experience with free cash flow-motivated leveraged buyouts (LBOs). To forestall a hostile
bid, companies voluntarily took the steps an LBO bidder would have taken after a successful bid,
thereby eliminating the source of the premium. See Bengt Holstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corpo-
rate Governance and Merger Activity in the United States: Making Sense of the 198os and i99os,
15 J. ECON. PERSP. 131 (2001).
110 See Gilson, Globalizing, supra note 47, at 347-49.
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Fiat was required to accept debt that was convertible into Fiat shares
if certain financial targets were not met."' If the debt was converted
following poor performance, the controlling Agnelli family's ownership
in Fiat would be diluted from 30% to 22%. In fact, the performance
targets were not met, and the lending banks together became Fiat's
largest shareholder with a 30% interest. 1 2  The Agnelli family,
through its holding company, then invested £535 million to increase its
shareholdings back to 30%."13 The result was a sharp increase in the
controlling shareholder's equity, reducing the attractiveness of private
benefits of control. 1 4 From this perspective, globalization, even with-
out additional regulatory initiatives, will operate independently to un-
dermine inefficient controlling shareholder systems.
B. Understanding the Dynamics of Efficient
Controlling Shareholder Systems
The most serious policy concern with efficient controlling share-
holder systems is that controlled firms adapt less quickly to changes in
the economic environment. Because their private benefits of control
are largely nonpecuniary, controlled firms in efficient controlling
shareholder systems may be less nimble than widely held firms in re-
sponding to changes in the economic environment. The market for
corporate control can force a widely held firm to internalize change;
nothing plays a similar role in a controlling shareholder regime save
the market mechanism, which in an efficient controlling shareholder
system can be expected to operate rather slowly because of the absence
of the financial drain of tunneling. At the same time, we also see that
the importance of nonpecuniary private benefits of control may make
efficient controlling shareholder systems less stable. 115 From the per-
spective of the controlling shareholder, the relative value of nonpecu-
niary private benefits of control - the balance between nonpecuniary
private benefits and the pecuniary gains from a more adaptive control
structure - can shift with the identity and generation of the control-
ling shareholder.
At this point, however, we can do little more than identify the ten-
sion, rather than either effectively model or empirically test the rela-
tionship. And this is an appropriate point with which to conclude. To
better understand the macroeconomic impact of efficient controlling
111 Alan Cowell & Eric Sylvers, Fiat Is Trying To Get Back in the Fast Lane, INT'L HERALD
TRIB. (Paris), June i, 2004, at i.
112 Id.
113 Adrian Michaels, Agnellis To Pay 6535 Million To Keep Lead Fiat Stake, FIN. TIMES (Lon-
don), Sept. 17, 2005, at 8.
114 See supra p. 1649.
115 See supra p. 1670-71.
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shareholder systems, we need to better understand the micro-level dy-
namics of this ownership structure. As the focus of corporate govern-
ance scholarship shifts to controlling shareholder systems, we need to
think small.
